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Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that the rich have higher propensity to
save than do the poor. While this observation may appear to contradict
the homotheticity of preferences, we theoretically show that that is not
the case. Specifically, we consider an income fluctuation problem with
homothetic preferences and general shocks and prove that consumption
functions are asymptotically linear, with an exact analytical characteriza-
tion of asymptotic marginal propensities to consume (MPC). We provide
necessary and sufficient conditions for the asymptotic MPCs to be zero.
We solve a calibrated model with standard constant relative risk aver-
sion utility and show that asymptotic MPCs can be zero in empirically
plausible settings, implying an increasing and large saving rate of the rich.
Keywords: asymptotic linearity, income fluctuation problem, mono-
tone convex map, saving rate.
JEL codes: C65, D15, D52, E21.
1 Introduction
Empirical evidence suggests that the rich have higher propensity to save than
do the poor.1 This fact implies that the rich have lower marginal propensity
to consume (MPC), which has important economic consequences. For example,
when the rich have lower MPC, the consumption tax, which is a popular tax in-
strument in many countries, becomes regressive and may not be desirable from
equity perspectives. MPC heterogeneity also implies that the wealth distribu-
tion matters for determining aggregate consumption and hence for monetary
policy (Kaplan et al., 2018).
∗We thank Chris Carroll, E´milien Gouin-Bonenfant, Ben Moll, Johannes Wieland, and
seminar participants at CRETA Economic Theory Conference for valuable feedback and sug-
gestions. A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title “Asymptotic Marginal
Propensity to Consume”.
†International School of Economics and Management, Capital University of Economics and
Business. Email: qingyin.ma@cueb.edu.cn.
‡Department of Economics, University of California San Diego. Email: atoda@ucsd.edu.
1Quadrini (1999) documents that entrepreneurs (who tend to be rich) have high saving
rates. Dynan et al. (2004) document that there is a positive association between saving rates
and lifetime income. More recently, using Norwegian administrative data, Fagereng et al.
(2019) show that among households with positive net worth, saving rates are increasing in
wealth.
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Why do the rich save so much? Intuition suggests that canonical models
of consumption and savings that feature homothetic preferences are unable to
explain the high saving rate of the rich: in such models, consumption (hence sav-
ing) functions should be asymptotically linear in wealth due to homotheticity,
implying an asymptotically constant saving rate. A seemingly obvious explana-
tion for the high saving rate of the rich is that preferences are not homothetic.2
However, non-homothetic preferences have some undesirable theoretical proper-
ties. First, they are inconsistent with balanced growth (whereas many aggregate
economic variables such as real per capita GDP are near unit root processes),
at least in basic models in which preference parameters are constant. Second,
non-homothetic utility functions have more parameters than homothetic ones,
which introduces arbitrariness in model specification and calibration.
In this paper we theoretically show that the intuition of “homotheticity im-
plies (asymptotic) linearity” is only partially correct. We consider a standard
income fluctuation problem with (homothetic) constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) preferences but with capital and labor income risk in a general Marko-
vian setting. We prove that the consumption functions are asymptotically linear
in wealth, or the asymptotic marginal propensities to consume converge to some
constants. While this statement is intuitive, there is one surprise: we obtain
an exact analytical characterization of the asymptotic MPCs and prove that
they can be zero. The asymptotic MPCs depend only on risk aversion and the
stochastic processes for the discount factor and return on wealth, and are inde-
pendent of the income process. Furthermore, we derive necessary and sufficient
conditions for zero asymptotic MPCs. When the asymptotic MPCs are zero,
the saving rates of the rich converge to one as agents get wealthier. Thus, we
provide a potential explanation for why the rich save so much, and we do so
with standard homothetic preferences.
To prove that consumption functions are asymptotically linear with partic-
ular slopes, we apply policy function iteration as in Li and Stachurski (2014)
and Ma et al. (2020). Since agents cannot consume more than their financial
wealth in the presence of borrowing constraints, a natural upper bound on con-
sumption is asset, which is linear with a slope of 1. Starting from this candidate
consumption function, policy function iteration results in increasingly tighter
upper bounds. On the other hand, we directly obtain lower bounds by restrict-
ing the space of candidate consumption functions such that they have linear
lower bounds with specific slopes. We analytically derive these slopes based
on the fixed point theory of monotone convex maps developed in Du (1990),
which has recently been applied in economics by Toda (2019) and Borovicˇka
and Stachurski (2020). Finally, we show that the upper and lower bounds thus
obtained have identical slopes, implying the asymptotic linearity of consumption
functions with an exact characterization of asymptotic MPCs.
To assess the empirical plausibility of our new mechanism, we numerically
solve an income fluctuation problem with CRRA utility and capital income risk
calibrated to the U.S. economy. We find that with moderate risk aversion (above
4–5), the asymptotic MPCs become zero and the saving rates of the rich are
2For example, Carroll (2000) considers a ‘capitalist spirit’ model in which agents directly
get utility from holding wealth, where the utility functions for consumption and wealth have
different curvatures. De Nardi (2004) considers a model with bequest, which is mathemati-
cally similar. Another possibility is to introduce frictions such as portfolio adjustment costs
(Fagereng et al., 2019).
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increasing and approach 1.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After a brief discussion of
the related literature, Section 2 introduces a general income fluctuation prob-
lem, proves the asymptotic linearity of consumption functions with homothetic
preferences, and discusses some examples. Section 3 applies the theory to a
calibrated model. Section 4 contains the proofs.
1.1 Related literature
Our paper is related to the theoretical studies of the income fluctuation prob-
lem, which is a key building block of heterogeneous-agent models in modern
macroeconomics.3 Chamberlain and Wilson (2000) study the existence of a so-
lution assuming bounded utility and applying the contraction mapping theorem.
Li and Stachurski (2014) relax the boundedness assumption and apply policy
function iteration. Ma et al. (2020) allow for stochastic discounting and returns
on wealth in a general Markovian setting and discuss the ergodicity, stochastic
stability, and tail behavior of wealth. Carroll (2020) examines detailed prop-
erties of a special model with CRRA utility, constant discounting and risk-free
rate, and iid permanent and transitory income shocks. While the main focus
of these papers is the existence, uniqueness, and computation of a solution, we
focus on the asymptotic behavior of consumption with general shocks. Carroll
and Kimball (1996) show the concavity of consumption functions in a class of
income fluctuation problems, which implies asymptotic linearity. However, they
do not characterize the asymptotic MPCs as we do.
2 Asymptotic linearity of consumption functions
In this section we introduce a general income fluctuation problem following the
setting in Ma et al. (2020) and study the asymptotic property of the consump-
tion functions when preferences are homothetic.
2.1 Income fluctuation problem
Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . Let at be the financial wealth of
the agent at the beginning of period t. The agent chooses consumption ct ≥ 0
and saves the remaining wealth at − ct. The period utility function is u and
the discount factor, gross return on wealth, and non-financial income in period
t are denoted by βt, Rt, Yt, where we normalize β0 = 1. Thus the agent solves
maximize E0
∞∑
t=0
(
t∏
i=0
βi
)
u(ct)
subject to at+1 = Rt+1(at − ct) + Yt+1, (2.1a)
0 ≤ ct ≤ at, (2.1b)
3See, for example, Cao (2020) and Ac¸ıkgo¨z (2018) for the existence of equilibrium with and
without aggregate shocks, where the theoretical properties of the income fluctuation problem
play an important role. Lehrer and Light (2018) and Light (2018) prove comparative statics
results regarding savings. Light (2020) proves the uniqueness of stationary equilibrium in an
Aiyagari model that exhibits the gross substitute property.
3
where the initial wealth a0 = a > 0 is given, (2.1a) is the budget constraint,
and (2.1b) implies that the agent cannot borrow.4 The stochastic processes
{βt, Rt, Yt}t≥1 obey
βt = β(Zt, εt), Rt = R(Zt, ζt), Yt = Y (Zt, ηt),
where β,R, Y are nonnegative measurable functions, {Zt}t≥0 is a time-homogeneous
finite state Markov chain taking values in Z = {1, . . . , Z} with a transition prob-
ability matrix P , and the innovation processes {εt} , {ζt} , {ηt} are independent
and identically distributed (iid) over time and mutually independent.
We introduce the following notation. For a square matrix A, the scalar r(A)
denotes its spectral radius (largest absolute value of all eigenvalues). The sym-
bols β,R, Y are shorthand of β(Z, ε), R(Z, ζ), Y (Z, η) and βˆ, Rˆ, Yˆ are shorthand
of β(Zˆ, εˆ), R(Zˆ, ζˆ), Y (Zˆ, ηˆ). Define the diagonal matrix Dβ by
Dβ(z, z) = Ez β = E [β(Z, ε) |Z = z] = Eβ(z, ε).
More generally, for any stochastic process {Xt} such that the distribution of Xt
conditional on all past information and Zt = z depends only on z, let DX be
the diagonal matrix such that DX(z, z) = EzX = E [X |Z = z]. Consider the
following assumptions.
Assumption 1. The utility function u : [0,∞) → R ∪ {−∞} is twice contin-
uously differentiable on (0,∞) and satisfies u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, u′(0) = ∞, and
u′(∞) < 1.
Assumption 1 is essentially the usual Inada condition together with mono-
tonicity and concavity.
Assumption 2. The following conditions hold:
1. Ez β <∞ and Ez βR <∞ for all z ∈ Z,
2. r(PDβ) < 1 and r(PDβR) < 1,
3. Ez Y <∞ and Ez u′(Y ) <∞ for all z ∈ Z.
The condition r(PDβ) < 1 generalizes β < 1 to the case with random
discount factors. The condition r(PDβR) < 1 generalizes the ‘impatience’ con-
dition βR < 1 to the stochastic case. Under these two assumptions, the income
fluctuation problem (2.1) admits a unique solution.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then the income fluctuation
problem (2.1) has a unique solution. Furthermore, the consumption function
c(a, z) can be computed by policy function iteration.
Proof. See Ma et al. (2020, Theorem 2.2).5
4The no-borrowing condition at − ct ≥ 0 is without loss of generality as discussed in
Chamberlain and Wilson (2000) and Li and Stachurski (2014).
5In addition to Assumptions 1 and 2, Ma et al. (2020) assume that the transition probability
matrix P is irreducible. However, irreducibility is required only for their ergodicity result, not
for existence and uniqueness of a solution.
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‘Policy function iteration’ means the following. When the borrowing con-
straint ct ≤ at does not bind, the Euler equation implies
u′(ct) = Et βt+1Rt+1u′(ct+1).
If ct = at, then clearly u
′(ct) = u′(at). Therefore combining these two cases, we
can compactly express the Euler equation as
u′(ct) = max {Et βt+1Rt+1u′(ct+1), u′(at)} .
Based on this observation, given a candidate consumption function c(a, z), the
policy function iteration updates the consumption function by the value ξ =
Tc(a, z) that solves
u′(ξ) = max
{
Ez βˆRˆu
′(c(Rˆ(a− ξ) + Yˆ , Zˆ)), u′(a)
}
. (2.2)
Let C be the space of candidate consumption functions such that c : (0,∞)×Z→
R is continuous, is increasing in the first element, 0 < c(a, z) ≤ a for all a > 0
and z ∈ Z, and
sup
(a,z)∈(0,∞)×Z
|u′(c(a, z))− u′(a)| <∞.
For c, d ∈ C, define
ρ(c, d) = sup
(a,z)∈(0,∞)×Z
|u′(c(a, z))− u′(d(a, z))| . (2.3)
When Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, Theorem 2.2 of Ma et al. (2020) shows that C
is a complete metric space with metric ρ and T : C → C defined as Tc(a, z) = ξ
that solves (2.2) is a contraction mapping. We call the operator T the time
iteration operator.6
Exploiting policy function iteration, Ma et al. (2020) show several properties
such as (i) consumption and savings are increasing in wealth and (ii) consump-
tion is increasing in income.
2.2 Asymptotic linearity of consumption functions
To study the asymptotic behavior of consumption, we strengthen Assumption
1 as follows.
Assumption 1’. The utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion
γ > 0: we have
u(c) =
{
c1−γ
1−γ , (γ 6= 1)
log c. (γ = 1)
(2.4)
Furthermore, Ez βR
1−γ <∞ for all z.7
6The time iteration operator was introduced by Coleman (1990). Several papers such as
Datta et al. (2002), Rabault (2002), Morand and Reffett (2003), Kuhn (2013), and Li and
Stachurski (2014) use this approach to establish existence of solutions and study theoretical
properties.
7We use the convention βR1−γ = (βR)R−γ and 0 · ∞ = 0. Then Ez βR1−γ ∈ [0,∞] is
well-defined even if γ > 1 and (β,R) = (0, 0) with positive probability.
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The assumption Ez βR
1−γ <∞ is for expositional purpose and is relaxed in
Theorem 2.3 later. The following is our main theoretical result.
Theorem 2.2. Suppose Assumptions 1’ and 2 hold. Let D = DβR1−γ be the
diagonal matrix whose (z, z)-th element is Ez βR
1−γ <∞. Then the followings
are true:
1. If r(PD) < 1, then
lim
a→∞
c(a, z)
a
= c¯(z) (2.5)
for all z ∈ Z, where c¯(z) = x∗(z)−1/γ and x∗ = (x∗(z))Zz=1 ∈ RZ+ is the
unique solution to the system of equations
x(z) = (Fx)(z) :=
(
1 + (PDx)(z)1/γ
)γ
, z = 1, . . . , Z. (2.6)
2. If r(PD) ≥ 1 and PD is irreducible, then
lim
a→∞
c(a, z)
a
= 0
for all z ∈ Z.
Theorem 2.2 is surprising, for two reasons. First, in typical income fluc-
tuation problems, we usually require a condition of the form Ez βˆRˆ
1−γ < 1.8
However, Ma et al. (2020) show that for a general income fluctuation problem to
have a solution, no conditions on risk aversion are required beyond Assumptions
1 and 2 as we can see from Theorem 2.1. Thus the classical “finite value condi-
tion” (Carroll, 2009) of the form Ez βˆRˆ
1−γ < 1 is not necessary for the existence
of a solution. Second, when the utility function exhibits constant relative risk
aversion, Theorem 2.2 implies that the consumption functions are asymptoti-
cally linear with no further conditions on γ. While this is to be expected based
on the intuition of scale invariance with homothetic preferences, we are not
aware of a proof in a general setting. Furthermore, the second part of Theorem
2.2 states that when the finite value condition is violated, it is possible that the
asymptotic consumption rate is zero, which was not previously recognized.
Theorem 2.2 does not cover all possible cases, as Ez βR
1−γ could be infinite
or the matrix PD need not be irreducible in particular applications. We can
generalize Theorem 2.2 to cover all possible cases at the cost of making the
notation slightly more complicated. To this end, let K = PD be as in Theorem
2.2, where the diagonal element D(z, z) = Ez βR
1−γ could be infinite. By
relabeling the states z = 1, . . . , Z if necessary, without loss of generality we may
assume that K is block upper triangular,
K =
K1 · · · ∗... . . . ...
0 · · · KJ
 , (2.7)
8See, for example, the discussion on p. 244 of Samuelson (1969), Equation (9) of Krebs
(2006), Equation (3) of Carroll (2009), Equation (18) of Toda (2014), or Equation (3) of Toda
(2019).
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where each diagonal block Kj is irreducible.
9 Partition Z as Z = Z1 ∪ · · · ∪ ZJ
accordingly. Then we have the following complete characterization.
Theorem 2.3. Suppose Assumption 2 holds and the utility function exhibits
constant relative risk aversion γ > 0. Express K = PD as in (2.7). Define the
sequence {xn}∞n=0 ∈ [0,∞]Z by x0 = 1 and xn = Fxn−1, where F is as in (2.6)
and we apply the convention 0 · ∞ = 0. Then {xn} monotonically converges to
x∗ ∈ [1,∞]Z , and the limit (2.5) holds with c¯(z) = x∗(z)−1/γ ∈ [0, 1].
Furthermore, c¯(z) = 0 if and only if there exist j, zˆ ∈ Zj, and m ∈ N such
that Km(z, zˆ) > 0 and r(Kj) ≥ 1, where r(Kj) = ∞ if some element of Kj is
infinite.
An interesting implication of Theorems 2.2 and 2.3 is that the asymptotic
MPCs c¯(z) depend only on the matrix PD, which in turn depends only on rela-
tive risk aversion γ as well as “multiplicative shocks” β and R, and not on “addi-
tive shocks” Y . The following corollary verifies the intuition in Gouin-Bonenfant
and Toda (2018) that only multiplicative shocks matter for characterizing the
behavior of wealthy agents.
Corollary 2.4 (Irrelevance of additive shocks). Let everything be as in Theorem
2.3. The asymptotic MPCs c¯(z) depend only on the asymptotic relative risk
aversion γ, transition probability matrix P , the discount factor β, and the return
on wealth R, and not on income Y .
2.3 Examples
The system of fixed point equations (2.6) is in general nonlinear and does not
admit a closed-form solution. Below, we discuss several examples with explicit
solutions.
Example 2.1. If γ = 1, then (2.6) becomes
x∗ = 1 + PDx∗ ⇐⇒ x∗ = (I − PD)−11,
where D = Dβ = diag(. . . ,Ez β, . . . ).
10 This example generalizes the log utility
case discussed in the Online Appendix of Toda (2019).11 A corollary is that
with log utility, we always have c¯(z) > 0.
Example 2.2. If b = b(z) = Ez βR
1−γ does not depend on z, then D = bI. If
x = k1 is a multiple of the vector 1, then PDx = bPk1 = bk1 because P is a
transition probability matrix. Thus if b < 1, (2.6) reduces to
x∗(z) = (1 + (bx∗(z))1/γ)γ ⇐⇒ x∗(z) = (1− b1/γ)−γ ⇐⇒ c¯(z) = 1− b1/γ .
9Such a decomposition is always possible. Recall that a square matrix A is reducible if
there exists a permutation matrix P such that P>AP is block upper triangular with at least
two diagonal blocks. Matrices that are not reducible are irreducible. Hence by definition
scalars (1× 1 matrices, including zero) are irreducible, so some Kj in (2.7) can be zero if it is
1× 1.
10Note that since r(PD) = r(PDβ) < 1 by Assumption 2, (I − PD)−1 =
∑∞
k=0(PD)
k
exists and is nonnegative.
11In Toda (2019), there is an expression I − BP , not I − PB, where B plays the role of
the diagonal matrix D in Theorem 2.2. This difference comes from the fact that the discount
factors are predetermined in Toda (2019), whereas they are (potentially) stochastic in our
more general setting.
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This example shows that with constant discounting (β(z, ε) ≡ β) and risk-free
saving (R(z, ζ) ≡ R), the asymptotic MPC is constant regardless of the income
shocks:
c¯(z) =
{
1− (βR1−γ)1/γ if βR1−γ < 1,
0 otherwise.
Example 2.3. Suppose the return on wealth Rt = R(Zt, ζt) does not depend
on Zt, so Rt = R(ζt). Assume further that logRt is normally distributed with
standard deviation σ and mean µ− σ2/2, so ER = eµ. Let the discount factor
β = e−δ be constant, where δ > 0 is the discount rate. Then using the property
of the normal distribution, we obtain
1 > EβR = e−δ+µ ⇐⇒ δ > µ,
1 > EβR1−γ = e−δ+(1−γ)(µ−γσ
2/2) ⇐⇒ δ > (1− γ)
(
µ− 1
2
γσ2
)
.
Therefore assuming δ > µ for Assumption 2 to hold, it follows from Example
2.2 that
c¯(z) =
{
1− e−ψδ−(1−ψ)(µ−γσ2/2) > 0 if δ > (1− γ) (µ− 12γσ2),
0 otherwise,
where ψ = 1/γ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. If γ > 1, then
(1 − γ)(µ − γσ2/2) → ∞ as γ, σ → ∞, so the asymptotic MPC is 0 if risk
aversion or volatility is sufficiently high.
3 Asymptotic MPCs and saving rates
In this section we apply our theory of asymptotic MPCs to shed light on the
saving rate of the rich.
3.1 General theory
We define an agent’s saving rate by the change in net worth divided by to-
tal income excluding capital loss (to prevent the denominator from becoming
negative):
st+1 =
at+1 − at
max {(Rt+1 − 1)(at − ct), 0}+ Yt+1 . (3.1)
For x ∈ R, define its positive and negative parts by x+ = max {x, 0} and
x− = −min {x, 0}. Then x = x+ − x−. Using the budget constraint (2.1a), the
saving rate (3.1) can be rewritten as
st+1 =
[(Rt+1 − 1)+ − (Rt+1 − 1)−](at − ct) + Yt+1 − ct
(Rt+1 − 1)+(at − ct) + Yt+1
= 1− (Rˆ− 1)
−(1− c/a) + c/a
(Rˆ− 1)+(1− c/a) + Yˆ /a ∈ (−∞, 1). (3.2)
Letting a→∞, the saving rate of an infinitely wealthy agent becomes
s¯ := 1− (Rˆ− 1)
−(1− c¯) + c¯
(Rˆ− 1)+(1− c¯) ∈ [−∞, 1], (3.3)
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where c¯ is the asymptotic MPC. Under what conditions can the saving rate (3.2)
be increasing in wealth, and in particular, can the asymptotic saving rate (3.3)
become positive? The following proposition provides a negative answer within
a class of models.
Proposition 3.1. Consider a canonical Bewley (1977) model in which agents
are infinitely-lived and relative risk aversion γ, discount factor β, and return on
wealth R > 1 are constant. Then in the stationary equilibrium the asymptotic
saving rate (3.3) is negative.
Proof. Stachurski and Toda (2019) show that it must be βR < 1 in the station-
ary equilibrium. Since R > 1 by assumption, we obtain βR1−γ = (βR)R−γ < 1.
By Example 2.2, the asymptotic MPC is c¯ = 1− (βR1−γ)1/γ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore
using (3.3), we obtain
s¯ = 1− c¯
(R− 1)(1− c¯) < 0 ⇐⇒ (R− 1)(1− c¯) < c¯
⇐⇒ (R− 1)(βR1−γ)1/γ < 1− (βR1−γ)1/γ
⇐⇒ (βR)1/γ < 1,
which holds because βR < 1.
Proposition 3.1 proves that the negativity of the asymptotic saving rate is
inevitable in any canonical Bewley model.12 Thus, these models are unable to
explain the observed positive saving rates of the rich. The following proposition
shows that just by allowing β or R to be stochastic need not solve the problem
when c¯ > 0.
Proposition 3.2. Consider a Bewley (1977) model in which agents are infinitely-
lived, relative risk aversion γ is constant, and {βt, Rt}t≥1 is iid with ER > 1
and EβR1−γ < 1. If the stationary equilibrium wealth distribution has an un-
bounded support, then the asymptotic saving rate (3.3) evaluated at Rˆ = ER is
nonpositive.
Proof. Since by assumption EβR1−γ < 1, by Example 2.2 the asymptotic MPC
is c¯ = 1 − (EβR1−γ)1/γ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore using (3.3), the asymptotic saving
rate evaluated at ER > 1 is
s¯ = 1− c¯
(ER− 1)(1− c¯) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ (ER− 1)(1− c¯) ≤ c¯
⇐⇒ ER(1− c¯) ≤ 1.
Since ER(1 − c¯) is the expected growth rate of wealth for infinitely wealthy
agents, if the wealth distribution is unbounded and ER(1− c¯) > 1, then wealth
will grow at the top, which violates stationarity. Therefore in a stationary
equilibrium, it must be s¯ ≤ 0.
One possible explanation for the positive and increasing saving rates is to
consider models with discount factor or return heterogeneity. If r(PDβR1−γ ) ≥
1, then by Theorem 2.2 we have c¯ = 0 and hence the asymptotic saving rate
becomes s¯ = 1 > 0 using (3.3).13
12This result has a similar flavor to Stachurski and Toda (2019), who prove that canonical
Bewley models cannot explain the tail behavior of wealth.
13Another possibility is to consider overlapping generations models. Stachurski and Toda
9
3.2 Numerical example
To show the theoretical possibility of positive and increasing saving rates, we
consider a numerical example calibrated from U.S. data. The agent has constant
discount factor β and relative risk aversion γ > 0. We suppose that wealthy
agents invest their wealth into stocks, private businesses, and a risk-free asset
in constant proportions subject to a capital income tax. Let Rst , R
b
t be the gross
returns on stock and business between time t− 1 and t, and let Rf be the gross
risk-free rate. The stock return process {Rst} exhibits constant expected return
ERst = e
µ with GARCH(1, 1) innovations:
logRst = µ−
1
2
σ2t + t, (3.4a)
t = σtζt, ζt ∼ iidN(0, 1) (3.4b)
σ2t = ω + α
2
t−1 + ρσ
2
t−1, (3.4c)
where σt > 0 is conditional volatility, t is a zero mean innovation, and we
assume ω, α, ρ > 0 and α + ρ < 1 to ensure stationarity. We model business
returns parsimoniously and set
Rbt =
{
1
1−pbR
s
t with probability 1− pb,
0 with probability pb,
so that private businesses go bankrupt with probability pb but otherwise business
returns are perfectly correlated with the stock return with identical mean.14
Letting τ be the capital income tax rate, the after-tax gross portfolio return is
Rt(θ) := 1 + (1− τ)(θsRst + θbRbt + θfRf − 1), (3.5)
where θ = (θs, θb, θf ) is the portfolio with θs + θb + θf = 1.
To calibrate the stock return parameters, we use the 1947–2018 monthly data
for U.S. stock market returns (volume-weighted index including dividends) and
risk-free rates from the updated spreadsheet of Welch and Goyal (2008).15 Their
spreadsheet contains monthly nominal stock and risk-free returns as well as the
inflation. From these we construct the real gross stock and risk-free returns
Rst , R
f
t , define the residual ̂t in (3.4a) by demeaning the log excess returns
logRst − logRft , and estimate the GARCH parameters ω = 9.1297 × 10−5,
α = 0.8354, and ρ = 0.1188. We estimate the log risk-free rate as logRf =
E[logRft ] = 5.3477 × 10−4 (annual rate 0.65%). We estimate the log expected
return as µ = log(ERst ) = 6.8011×10−3 (annual rate 8.19%). Because our model
requires a finite state Markov chain, we discretize the GARCH(1, 1) process
(3.4) using the Farmer and Toda (2017) method as described in Appendix B
with Nv = 3 points for the volatility state and N = 15 for the return state.
To calibrate the portfolio shares θ = (θs, θb, θf ), we use the 1913–2012 wealth
share data of the wealthiest households in U.S. estimated by Saez and Zucman
(2019, Theorem 9) present a model with random birth/death and show that it is possible to
have βR > 1 in equilibrium. In this case, by the proof of Proposition 3.1, we have s¯ > 0.
14Since business returns are modeled as a mean-preserving spread of stock returns, risk
averse and unconstrained agents would never hold business assets. Here we suppose that
wealthy agents hold business assets for other reasons, for example retaining voting rights in
shareholder meetings.
15http://www.hec.unil.ch/agoyal/docs/PredictorData2018.xlsx.
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(2016). Specifically, in Table B5b of their Online Appendix, they report the
composition of wealth of the top 0.01% across asset groups (equities, fixed in-
come claims, housing, business assets, and pensions). We classify equities and
pension as “stock”, business assets as “business”, and fixed income claims and
housing as “risk-free asset” to compute the portfolio share θ for all years,16 take
the average across all years, and obtain (θs, θb, θf ) = (0.5546, 0.0827, 0.3627).
We calibrate the remaining parameters as follows. The discount factor is
β = e−0.05/12 so that the annual discounting is 5%. The bankruptcy probability
is pb = 1 − e−0.025/12 so that the annual exit rate is 2.5% as documented in
Luttmer (2010) for firms with more than 500 employees. The capital income
tax rate is τ = 0.25 based on the estimate in McDaniel (2007) using national
account statistics.
To solve the income fluctuation problem (2.1), we need to specify the income
process. Because the U.S. economy has been growing, and by Corollary 2.4
the details on the income process is irrelevant for the asymptotic MPCs, for
simplicity we assume that income grows at a constant rate g, so Yt = e
gt. We
calibrate the growth rate g from the U.S. real per capita GDP in 1947–2018 and
obtain g = 1.6208× 10−3 at the monthly frequency. Although the theory in Ma
et al. (2020) requires a stationary process for income, it is straightforward to
allow for constant growth in income by detrending the model when the utility
function is CRRA. After simple algebra, it suffices to use
R˜t(θ) = Rt(θ)e
−g,
β˜ = βe(1−γ)g,
Y˜t = Yte
−gt = 1.
In the current setting, Assumption 1’ and conditions 1 and 3 of Assump-
tion 2 obviously hold. To apply Theorems 2.1 and 2.2, it remains to determine
r(PDβR), r(PDβR1−γ ) ≷ 1. Figure 1 shows the determination of the asymptotic
MPC c¯(z) when we change the relative risk aversion γ and the annual discount
rate δ. We see that the asymptotic MPCs can be zero if relative risk aversion
is moderately high (above 4–5).17
Is the possibility of zero asymptotic MPC empirically plausible? To address
this concern, we do a simple calculation similar to Friend and Blume (1975).
Although our paper abstracts from portfolio choice, suppose that wealthy agents
choose the portfolio θs, θf (fixing θb) by maximizing the certainty equivalent of
return E[R(θ)1−γ ]
1
1−γ , where R(θ) is the gross portfolio return in (3.5) and the
expectation is taken over the ergodic distribution of asset returns. The first-
order condition of this optimization problem is
E[R(θ)−γ(Rs −Rf )] = 0. (3.6)
Using our discretized asset returns and the portfolio share θ, the relative risk
aversion that makes (3.6) hold is γ = 6.38. According to Figure 1, this level of
16These portfolio shares are relatively stable over time. Although the classification of hous-
ing and pension may be ambiguous, because these two categories comprise a small fraction
(about 10%) of the portfolio, choosing different classifications give quantitatively similar re-
sults.
17In fact, if Assumption 2 holds and γ ≤ 1, then r(PDβR1−γ ) < 1 as shown in Proposi-
tion A.1. Therefore γ > 1 is necessary for c¯(z) = 0.
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Figure 1: Determination of asymptotic MPCs with GARCH(1, 1) returns.
risk aversion makes the asymptotic MPC c¯(z) equal to zero for any reasonable
discount rates.
We next solve the model for γ = 3, 5 using policy function iteration. Accord-
ing to Figure 1 and Theorem 2.1, a unique solution exists in each case given the
calibrated discount factor. Figure 2 shows the optimal consumption rule. Con-
sistent with our theory, for γ = 3 the consumption functions are approximately
linear with positive slopes for high asset level. When γ = 5, the consumption
functions show a more concave pattern.
Figure 3 plots the consumption rates (solid lines) in log-log scale. We see that
the consumption rates are decreasing in wealth for each realized volatility. For
γ = 3, as asset level gets large, the asymptotic MPCs approach to positive con-
stants that coincide with the theoretical values calculated based on Theorem 2.2
(dotted lines), indicating that the consumption functions are asymptotically lin-
ear, consistent with the theorem. For γ = 5, the consumption rates exhibit a
clear decreasing trend even when asset is extremely large (a ≈ 1010), which is
consistent with zero asymptotic MPC established in Theorem 2.2.
Finally, Figure 4 shows the saving rates assuming σ2t = σ
2
t+1 ∈
{
σ2l , σ
2
m, σ
2
h
}
and  = 0. When wealth is low, the borrowing constraint binds and labor in-
come is the only source of income and net worth accumulation, i.e., st+1 =
(Yt+1 − a)/Yt+1 = 1− e−ga, which is decreasing in asset. A moderately greater
wealth implies lower saving rates because capital income is used to finance dis-
proportionately large consumption. The saving rate starts to increase when
wealth is relatively high (≈ 100). Importantly, when γ = 5 and σ2 ∈ {σ2l , σ2m},
the saving rate is increasing in wealth among agents with large asset and the
asymptotic saving rate equals 1,18 as opposed to the increasing but either nega-
tive or small positive saving rate when γ = 3. This example illustrates that the
empirically observed large positive and increasing saving rate could potentially
be explained by models with capital income risk, particularly those with zero
asymptotic MPC.
18When σ2 = σ2h, the saving rate becomes negative because Rˆ < 1 when  = 0; see (3.2).
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Figure 2: Optimal consumption rule.
Note: The top and bottom panels plot the consumption functions in the range a ∈ [0, 100]
and a ∈ [0, 1010], respectively. Here and in other figures, the left (right) panels correspond to
γ = 3 (γ = 5). For visibility, we plot across asset and the three volatility states σ2l < σ
2
m < σ
2
h
holding  = 0 constant.
4 Proofs
The proof of Theorem 2.2 is technical and consists of the following steps:
1. show that policy function iteration leads to increasingly tighter upper
bounds on consumption functions that are asymptotically linear with ex-
plicit slopes,
2. show that the slopes of the upper bounds converge using the fixed point
theory of monotone convex maps, and
3. show that the consumption functions have linear lower bounds with iden-
tical slopes to the limit of upper bounds, implying asymptotic linearity.
Let C be the space of candidate consumption functions and T : C → C be
the time iteration operator as defined in Section 2. The following proposition
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Figure 4: Saving rate.
allows us to asymptotically bound the consumption rate c(a, z)/a from above.
Proposition 4.1. Let everything be as in Theorem 2.2. If c ∈ C and
lim sup
a→∞
c(a, z)
a
≤ x(z)−1/γ
for some x(z) ≥ 1 for all z ∈ Z, then
lim sup
a→∞
Tc(a, z)
a
≤ (Fx)(z)−1/γ . (4.1)
Proof. Let α = lim supa→∞ Tc(a, z)/a. By definition, we can take an increasing
sequence {an} such that α = limn→∞ Tc(an, z)/an. Define αn = Tc(an, z)/an ∈
(0, 1] and
λn =
c(Rˆ(1− αn)an + Yˆ , Zˆ)
an
> 0. (4.2)
Let us show that
lim sup
n→∞
λn ≤ x(Zˆ)−1/γRˆ(1− α). (4.3)
14
To see this, if α < 1 and Rˆ > 0, then since Rˆ(1− αn)an → Rˆ(1− α) · ∞ =∞,
by assumption we have
lim sup
n→∞
λn = lim sup
n→∞
c(Rˆ(1− αn)an + Yˆ , Zˆ)
Rˆ(1− αn)an + Yˆ
(
Rˆ(1− αn) + Yˆ
an
)
≤ lim sup
a→∞
c(a, Zˆ)
a
× Rˆ(1− α)
≤ x(Zˆ)−1/γRˆ(1− α),
which is (4.3). If α = 1 or Rˆ = 0, then since c(a, z) ≤ a, we have
λn =
c(Rˆ(1− αn)an + Yˆ , Zˆ)
Rˆ(1− αn)an + Yˆ
(
Rˆ(1− αn) + Yˆ
an
)
≤ Rˆ(1− αn) + Yˆ
an
→ Rˆ(1− α) = 0,
so again (4.3) holds.
Since ξn := Tc(an, z) = αnan solves the Euler equation, using u
′(c) = c−γ
and the definition of λn in (4.2), we have
0 =
u′(αnan)
u′(an)
−max
{
Ez βˆRˆ
u′(c(Rˆ(1− αn)an + Yˆ , Zˆ))
u′(an)
, 1
}
= α−γn −max
{
Ez βˆRˆ(c(Rˆ(1− αn)an + Yˆ , Zˆ)/an)−γ , 1
}
= α−γn −max
{
Ez βˆRˆλ
−γ
n , 1
}
=⇒ α−γn = max
{
Ez βˆRˆλ
−γ
n , 1
}
≥ Ez βˆRˆλ−γn . (4.4)
Now letting n→∞ in (4.4) and applying Fatou’s lemma, we obtain
α−γ = lim
n→∞α
−γ
n ≥ lim inf
n→∞ Ez βˆRˆλ
−γ
n
≥ Ez lim inf
n→∞ βˆRˆλ
−γ
n
= Ez βˆRˆ
[
lim sup
n→∞
λn
]−γ
≥ Ez βˆRˆ
[
x(Zˆ)−1/γRˆ(1− α)
]−γ
by (4.3). Solving the inequality for α and using the convention βR1−γ =
(βR)R−γ and 0 · ∞ = 0 (see Footnote 7), we obtain
lim sup
a→∞
Tc(a, z)
a
= α ≤ 1
1 +
(
Ez βˆRˆ1−γx(Zˆ)
)1/γ = (Fx)(z)−1/γ .
Starting from the trivial upper bound c(a, z) ≤ a and applying Proposi-
tion 4.1 repeatedly we obtain increasingly tighter upper bounds of c(a, z). The
following proposition characterizes the limits of the slopes of the upper bounds.
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Proposition 4.2. Let everything be as in Theorem 2.2. Then F in (2.6) has
a fixed point x∗ ∈ RZ+ if and only if r(PD) < 1, in which case the fixed point is
unique. Take any x0 ∈ RZ+ and define the sequence {xn}∞n=1 ⊂ RZ+ by
xn = Fxn−1 (4.5)
for all n ∈ N. Then the followings are true.
1. If r(PD) < 1, then {xn}∞n=1 converges to x∗.
2. If r(PD) ≥ 1 and PD is irreducible, then xn(z)→ x∗(z) =∞ as n→∞
for all z ∈ Z.
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4 below.
Lemma 4.3. Let γ > 0 and define φ : R+ → R+ by φ(t) = (1 + t1/γ)γ . Then
there exist a ≥ 1 and b ≥ 0 such that φ(t) ≤ at + b. Furthermore, we can take
a ≥ 1 arbitrarily close to 1. (The choice of b may depend on a.)
Proof. The proof depends on γ ≷ 1.
Case 1: γ ≤ 1. Let us show that we can take a = b = 1. Let f(t) = 1+t−φ(t).
Then f(0) = 0 and
f ′(t) = 1− φ′(t) = 1− γ(1 + t1/γ)γ−1 1
γ
t1/γ−1 = 1− (t−1/γ + 1)γ−1 ≥ 0,
so f(t) ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0. Therefore φ(t) ≤ 1 + t.
Case 2: γ > 1. By simple algebra we obtain
φ′′(t) = (γ − 1)(t−1/γ + 1)γ−2
(
− 1
γ
t−1/γ−1
)
< 0, (4.6)
so φ is increasing and concave. Therefore φ(t) ≤ φ(u) + φ′(u)(t− u) for all t, u.
Letting a = φ′(u) and b = max {0, φ(u)− φ′(u)u}, we obtain φ(t) ≤ at + b.
Furthermore, since φ′(t) = (t−1/γ + 1)γ−1 → 1 as t→∞, we can take a = φ′(u)
arbitrarily close to 1 by taking u large enough.
The following lemma slightly generalizes a result in Toda (2019).
Lemma 4.4. Let γ > 0 and K be a Z × Z nonnegative matrix. Define F :
RZ+ → RZ+ by Fx = φ(Kx), where φ is as in Lemma 4.3 and is applied element-
wise. Then F has a fixed point x∗ ∈ RZ+ if and only if r(K) < 1, in which case
x∗ is unique.
Take any x0 ∈ RZ+ and define the sequence {xn}∞n=1 ⊂ RZ+ by xn = Fxn−1
for all n ∈ N. Then the followings are true.
1. If r(K) < 1, then {xn}∞n=1 converges to x∗.
2. If r(K) ≥ 1 and K is irreducible, then xn(z)→ x∗(z) =∞ as n→∞ for
all z ∈ Z.
Proof. We divide the proof into several steps.
Step 1. If r(K) ≥ 1, then F does not have a fixed point. If in addition K is
irreducible, then xn(z)→∞ for all z ∈ Z.
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We prove the contrapositive. Suppose that F has a fixed point x∗ ∈ RZ+.
Since φ > 0, we have x∗  0. Since clearly φ(t) > t for all t ≥ 0, we have
x∗ = φ(Kx∗) Kx∗. SinceK is a nonnegative matrix, by the Perron-Frobenius
theorem, we can take a right eigenvector y > 0 such that y′K = r(K)y′. Since
x∗  Kx∗ and y > 0, we obtain
0 < y′(x∗ −Kx∗) =⇒ r(K)y′x∗ < y′x∗.
Dividing both sides by y′x∗ > 0, we obtain r(K) < 1.
Suppose that r(K) ≥ 1 and K is irreducible. Since K is nonnegative and φ is
strictly increasing, F = φ◦K is a monotone map. Therefore to show xn(z)→∞,
it suffices to show this when x0 = 0. Since x1 = Fx0 = F0 = 1 ≥ 0, applying
Fn−1 we obtain xn ≥ xn−1 for all n. Since {xn}∞n=0 is an increasing sequence
in RZ+, if it is bounded, then it converges to some x∗ ∈ RZ+. By continuity, x∗ is
a fixed point of F , which is a contradiction. Therefore {xn}∞n=0 is unbounded,
so xn(zˆ)→∞ for at least one zˆ ∈ Z. Since by assumption K is irreducible, for
each (z, zˆ) ∈ Z2, there exists m ∈ N such that Km(z, zˆ) > 0. Therefore
xm+n(z) ≥ Km(z, zˆ)xn(zˆ)→∞
as n→∞, so xn(z)→∞ for all z ∈ Z.
Step 2. If r(K) < 1, then F has a unique fixed point x∗ in RZ+. If we take
a ∈ [1, 1/r(K)) and b > 0 as in Lemma 4.3, then
1 ≤ x∗  (I − aK)−1b1. (4.7)
Take any fixed point x∗ ∈ RZ+ of F . Since φ(t) ≥ 1 for all t ≥ 0, clearly
x∗ ≥ 1. Since K is nonnegative and ar(K) < 1, the inverse (I − aK)−1 =∑∞
k=0(aK)
k exists and is nonnegative. Therefore
x∗ = Fx∗  aKx∗ + b1 =⇒ x∗  (I − aK)−1b1,
which is (4.7).
The proof of existence and uniqueness uses a similar strategy to Borovicˇka
and Stachurski (2020). Clearly F is a monotone map. Using (4.6), it follows
that F is convex if γ ≤ 1 and concave if γ ≥ 1. Define u0 = 0 and v0 = (I −
aK)−1b1 0. Then Fu0 = 1 0 = u0 and Fv0 = φ(Kv0) aKv0 + b1 = v0.
Hence by Theorem 2.1.2 of Zhang (2013), which is based on Theorem 3.1 of Du
(1990), F has a unique fixed point in [u0, v0] = [0, v0]. Since by (4.7) any fixed
point x∗ must lie in this interval, it follows that F has a unique fixed point in
RZ+.
Step 3. If r(K) < 1, then {xn}∞n=1 converges to x∗.
Let a ∈ [1, 1/r(K)), b > 0, and v0  0 be as in the previous step. Since
Fx = φ(Kx), we obtain
xn = Fxn−1 = φ(Kxn−1) aKxn−1 + b1.
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Iterating, we obtain
xn  (aK)nx0 +
n−1∑
k=0
(aK)k(b1)
= (aK)nx0 +
∞∑
k=0
(aK)k(b1)−
∞∑
k=n
(aK)k(b1)
= (aK)n(x0 − v0) + v0.
Since r(aK) = ar(K) < 1, we have (aK)n(x0 − v0) → 0 as n → ∞. Therefore
0 = u0  xn  v0 for large enough n. Again by Theorem 2.1.2 of Zhang (2013),
we have xn → x∗ as n→∞.
The following proposition allows us to obtain explicit linear lower bounds on
consumption functions.
Proposition 4.5. Let everything be as in Theorem 2.2. Suppose r(PD) < 1
and let x∗ ∈ RZ++ be the unique fixed point of F in (2.6). Restrict the candidate
space to
C0 = {c ∈ C | c(a, z) ≥ (z)a for all a > 0 and z ∈ Z} , (4.8)
where (z) = x∗(z)−1/γ ∈ (0, 1]. Then TC0 ⊂ C0.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that TC0 6⊂ C0. Then there exists c ∈ C0 such
that for some a > 0 and z ∈ Z, we have ξ := Tc(a, z) < (z)a.
Since u′ is strictly decreasing and (z) ∈ (0, 1], it follows from (2.2) that
u′(a) ≤ u′((z)a) < u′(ξ) = max
{
Ez βˆRˆu
′(c(Rˆ(a− ξ) + Yˆ , Zˆ)), u′(a)
}
.
Therefore it must be u′(a) < Ez βˆRˆu′(c(Rˆ(a − ξ) + Yˆ , Zˆ)). Since u′ is strictly
decreasing and c ∈ C0, we obtain
u′((z)a) < u′(ξ) = Ez βˆRˆu′(c(Rˆ(a− ξ) + Yˆ , Zˆ))
≤ Ez βˆRˆu′((Zˆ)(Rˆ(a− ξ) + Yˆ ))
≤ Ez βˆRˆu′((Zˆ)Rˆ[1− (z)]a).
Using u′(c) = c−γ and (z) = x∗(z)−1/γ , we obtain
x∗(z) < Ez βˆRˆ1−γx∗(Zˆ)[1− x∗(z)−1/γ ]−γ
⇐⇒ x∗(z) <
(
1 + (Ez βˆRˆ
1−γx∗(Zˆ))1/γ
)γ
=
(
1 + (PDx∗)(z)1/γ
)γ
,
which is a contradiction because x∗ is a fixed point of F in (2.6).
With all the above preparations, we can prove Theorem 2.2.
Proof of Theoreom 2.2. Define the sequence {cn} ⊂ C by c0(a, z) = a and
cn = Tcn−1 for all n ≥ 1. Since Tc(a, z) ≤ a for any c ∈ C, in particular
c1(a, z) = Tc0(a, z) ≤ a = c0(a, z). Since T : C → C is order preserving by
Lemma B.4 of Ma et al. (2020), by induction 0 ≤ cn ≤ cn−1 for all n and
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c(a, z) = limn→∞ cn(a, z) exists. Then by Theorem 2.2 of Ma et al. (2020),
this c is the unique fixed point of T and also the unique solution to the income
fluctuation problem (2.1).
Define the sequence {xn} ⊂ RZ++ by x0 = 1 and xn = Fxn−1, where F is
as in (2.6). By definition, we have c0(a, z)/a = 1 = x0(z)
−1/γ , so in particular
lim supa→∞ c0(a, z)/a ≤ x0(z)−1/γ for all z ∈ Z. Since cn ↓ c ≥ 0 point-wise, a
repeated application of Proposition 4.1 implies that
0 ≤ lim sup
a→∞
c(a, z)
a
≤ lim sup
a→∞
cn(a, z)
a
≤ xn(z)−1/γ . (4.9)
Case 1: r(PD) ≥ 1 and PD is irreducible. By Proposition 4.2 we have
xn(z)→∞ for all z ∈ Z. Letting n→∞ in (4.9), we obtain
lim
a→∞
c(a, z)
a
= 0.
Case 2: r(PD) < 1. By Proposition 4.2 we have xn(z)→ x∗(z), where x∗ is
the unique fixed point of F in (2.6). Letting n→∞ in (4.9), we obtain
lim sup
a→∞
c(a, z)
a
≤ x∗(z)−1/γ . (4.10)
On the other hand, a repeated application of Proposition 4.5 implies that
cn(a, z) ≥ x∗(z)−1/γa for all a > 0 and z ∈ Z. Since cn → c point-wise,
letting n→∞, dividing both sides by a > 0, and letting a→∞, we obtain
lim inf
a→∞
c(a, z)
a
≥ x∗(z)−1/γ . (4.11)
Combining (4.10) and (4.11), we obtain lima→∞ c(a, z)/a = c¯(z) = x∗(z)−1/γ .
The proof of Theorem 2.3 follows from the same idea as Theorem 2.2 by
considering each diagonal block separately.
Proof of Theorem 2.3. Since K is a nonnegative matrix (with elements that are
potentially infinite), the map F in (2.6) is monotone and therefore {xn}∞n=0
monotonically converges to some x∗ ∈ [1,∞]Z . To characterize x∗(z) and c¯(z),
we consider two cases.
Case 1: There exist j, zˆ ∈ Zj, and m ∈ N such that Km(z, zˆ) > 0
and r(Kj) ≥ 1. Define the block diagonal matrix K˜ = diag(K1, . . . ,KJ) and
the sequence {x˜n}∞n=0 ⊂ [0,∞]Z by x˜0 = 1 and iterating (2.6), where K is
replaced by K˜. Since K ≥ K˜ ≥ 0, clearly xn ≥ x˜n ≥ 1 for all n. Since by
definition K˜ is block diagonal with each diagonal block irreducible, by Lemma
4.4 we have x˜n(z)→∞ as n→∞ if and only if there exists j such that z ∈ Zj
and r(Kj) ≥ 1. (Although Lemma 4.4 assumes the elements of K are finite, the
infinite case is similar.) Replacing the vector 1 in (2.6) by 0 and iterating, we
obtain
xm+n ≥ Kmxn ≥ Kmx˜n.
Therefore if there exist j, zˆ ∈ Zj and m ∈ N such that Km(z, zˆ) > 0 and
r(Kj) ≥ 1, then
xm+n(z) ≥ Km(z, zˆ)x˜n(zˆ)→∞
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as n→∞, so x∗(z) =∞. In this case we obtain c¯(z) = 0 by the same argument
as in the proof of Proposition 4.1.
Case 2: For all j, either r(Kj) < 1 or K
m(z, zˆ) = 0 for all zˆ ∈ Zj
and m ∈ N. For any zˆ such that Km(z, zˆ) = 0 for all m, by (2.6) the value of
xn(z) is unaffected by all previous xk(zˆ) for k < n. Therefore for the purpose
of computing xn(z), we may drop all rows and columns of K corresponding to
such zˆ. The resulting matrix has block diagonal elements Kj with r(Kj) < 1
only, so this matrix has spectral radius less than 1. Therefore by Lemma 4.4,
we have xn(z)→ x∗(z) <∞ as n→∞. In this case we obtain c¯(z) = x∗(z)−1/γ
by the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 2.2.
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A Additional proofs
Proposition A.1. If Assumption 2 holds and γ ≤ 1, then r(PDβR1−γ ) < 1.
Proof. If γ = 1, then r(PDβR1−γ ) = r(PDβ) < 1 by Assumption 2. Suppose
γ ∈ (0, 1). For a nonnegative matrix A and θ > 0, let A(θ) = (A(z, zˆ)θ) be the
matrix of θ-th power. Also, let  denote the Hadamard (element-wise) product.
Applying Ho¨lder’s inequality, we obtain
Ez βR
1−γ = Ez βγ(βR)1−γ ≤ (Ez β)γ(Ez βR)1−γ .
Constructing diagonal matrices, we obtain
DβR1−γ ≤ D(γ)β D(1−γ)βR .
Multiplying P from left and noting that DX is diagonal, it follows that
PDβR1−γ ≤ P (D(γ)β D(1−γ)βR ) = (PDβ)(γ)  (PDβR)(1−γ).
Using the result in Elsner et al. (1988), we obtain
r(PDβR1−γ ) ≤ r(PDβ)γr(PDβR)1−γ < 1
by Assumption 2.
B Discretizing the GARCH(1, 1) process
In this appendix we explain how to discretize the GARCH(1, 1) process (3.4).
B.1 Constructing the grid
Let vt = σ
2
t . Using the properties of the GARCH process, it is known that the
expected conditional variance is
E[vt] =
ω
1− α− ρ .
23
Therefore it is natural to take an evenly-spaced grid {¯n}Nn=1, where N is an
odd number and the largest grid point ¯ := ¯N is some multiple of
√
ω
1−α−ρ .
Because the conditional variance of the GARCH process can be quite large, it
is also natural to choose an exponential grid (as discussed in Appendix B.3)
{v¯n}Nvn=1 such that the median point of the grid is ω1−α−ρ .
To determine the end points, let v
¯
= v1 and v¯ = vNv . In principle vt = σ
2
t
can be arbitrarily close to ω, so we set v
¯
= ω. For vt = σ
2
t to remain in the grid
when t−1 and σ2t−1 are at their maximum value, we need
v¯ ≥ ω + α¯2 + ρv¯ ⇐⇒ v¯ ≥ ω + α¯
2
1− ρ .
Setting ¯ = k
√
ω
1−α−ρ for some k > 0, we obtain
v¯ ≥ 1− ρ+ (k
2 − 1)α
1− ρ
ω
1− α− ρ . (B.1)
In order to be able to match up to the second moments of t when vt = v¯, it is
necessary and sufficient that
¯ ≥ √v¯ ⇐⇒ v¯ ≤ ¯2 = k
2ω
1− α− ρ . (B.2)
We have the following result.
Proposition B.1. Consider the GARCH(1, 1) process (3.4) with α+ρ < 1 and
set vt = σ
2
t . Let N ≥ 3 be an odd number and Nv ≥ 2. Then there exists a
discretization such that
1. {¯n}Nn=1 is evenly spaced and centered around 0,
2. {v¯n}Nvn=1 is exponentially spaced with minimum point ω and median point
ω
1−α−ρ , and
3. the conditional mean of vt and the conditional mean and variance of t
are exact.
Proof. Set ¯ = ¯N = k
√
ω
1−α−ρ for some k > 0. Combining (B.1) and (B.2),
we obtain
1− ρ+ (k2 − 1)α
1− ρ
ω
1− α− ρ ≤
k2ω
1− α− ρ
⇐⇒ 1− ρ+ (k2 − 1)α ≤ (1− ρ)k2
⇐⇒ (k2 − 1)(α+ ρ− 1) ≤ 0,
which always holds if k ≥ 1 because α+ ρ < 1. Set
(v
¯
, v¯) =
(
ω,
1− ρ+ (k2 − 1)α
1− ρ
ω
1− α− ρ
)
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for some k ≥ 1 and construct an exponential grid {vn}Nvn=1 on [v¯, v¯] with median
point ω1−α−ρ as explained in Appendix B.3. For the exponential grid to be
well-defined, we need
ω
1− α− ρ <
v
¯
+ v¯
2
=
1
2
(
ω +
1− ρ+ (k2 − 1)α
1− ρ
ω
1− α− ρ
)
⇐⇒ 2 < 1− α− ρ+ 1− ρ+ (k
2 − 1)α
1− ρ
⇐⇒ (1− ρ)(1 + α+ ρ) < 1− ρ+ (k2 − 1)α
⇐⇒ (1− ρ)(α+ ρ) < (k2 − 1)α, (B.3)
which holds for large enough k ≥ 1 because α > 0. To make (B.3) true, for
example we can set
k2 − 1 = N(1− ρ)(1 + ρ/α) ⇐⇒ k =
√
1 +N(1− ρ)(1 + ρ/α),
which satisfies k ≥ 1.19 In this case we have
v¯ = (1 +N(α+ ρ))
ω
1− α− ρ .
Applying Proposition B.1 and its proof, we can construct the grid {v¯n}Nvn=1
and {¯n}Nn=1 as follows.
Constructing grid for GARCH.
1. Select the number of grid points N ≥ 3 and Nv ≥ 2 to discretize the
return and variance states.
2. Set ¯ =
√
(1 +N(1− ρ)(1 + ρ/α)) ω1−α−ρ and construct the evenly-
spaced grid {¯n}Nn=1 on [−¯, ¯].
3. Set
(a, b, c) =
(
ω, (1 +N(α+ ρ))
ω
1− α− ρ ,
ω
1− α− ρ
)
and construct the exponentially-spaced grid {v¯n}Nvn=1 on [a, b] with
median point c as in Appendix B.3.
B.2 Constructing transition probabilities
Having constructed the grid, it remains to construct transition probabilities. Let
Z = {1, . . . , Nv} × {1, . . . , N} be the state space. If z = (m,n) ∈ Z, then the
current conditional variance and return are (v, ) = (v¯m, ¯n). The next period’s
conditional variance is then
vˆ = ω + α¯2n + ρv¯m.
19Setting k ∼ √N is advocated in Farmer and Toda (2017) based on the trapezoidal rule
for quadrature.
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This vˆ will in general not be a grid point. However, we can approximate the
transition to vˆ by assigning probabilities 1 − θ, θ to the two points v¯m′ , v¯m′+1
such that
vˆ = (1− θ)v¯m′ + θv¯m′+1,
where m′ is uniquely determined such that v¯m′ < vˆ ≤ vˆm′+1.
Because the distribution of ˆ is N(0, vˆ), we can assign probabilities on the
grid points {¯n}Nn=1 such that the mean and variance are exact. For this purpose,
we can use the maximum entropy method of Tanaka and Toda (2013, 2015) and
Farmer and Toda (2017). If N = 3, we can avoid optimizing because there is a
closed-form solution as follows. Assign probabilities p, 1−2p, p to points −¯, 0, ¯
so that E[] = 0 and Var[] = vˆ. For this purpose, we can set
vˆ = 2p¯2 ⇐⇒ p = vˆ
2¯2
,
which is always in (0, 1/2) because vˆ ≤ v¯ < ¯2.
B.3 Exponential grid
In many models, the state variable may become negative (e.g., asset holdings),
which causes a problem for constructing an exponentially-spaced grid because
we cannot take the logarithm of a negative number. Suppose we would like to
construct an N -point exponential grid on a given interval (a, b). A natural idea
to deal with such a case is as follows.
Constructing exponential grid.
1. Choose a shift parameter s > −a.
2. Construct an N -point evenly-spaced grid on (log(a+ s), log(b+ s)).
3. Take the exponential.
4. Subtract s.
The remaining question is how to choose the shift parameter s. Suppose we
would like to specify the median grid point as c ∈ (a, b). Since the median of
the evenly-spaced grid on (log(a + s), log(b + s)) is 12 (log(a + s) + log(b + s)),
we need to take s > −a such that
c = exp
(
1
2
(log(a+ s) + log(b+ s))
)
− s
⇐⇒ c+ s =
√
(a+ s)(b+ s)
⇐⇒ (c+ s)2 = (a+ s)(b+ s)
⇐⇒ c2 + 2cs+ s2 = ab+ (a+ b)s+ s2
⇐⇒ s = c
2 − ab
a+ b− 2c .
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Note that in this case
s+ a =
c2 − ab
a+ b− 2c + a =
(c− a)2
a+ b− 2c ,
so s + a is positive if and only if c < a+b2 . Therefore, for any c ∈
(
a, a+b2
)
, it
is possible to construct an exponentially-spaced grid with end points (a, b) and
median point c.
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